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I.   INTRODUCTION 
People start businesses to make money, or as scholars often say, 
“seek profit.”1 There are times when businesses have other goals, but 
making money is usually the top priority. This concept is unremarkable, 
but when an entity has other goals, and an investor objects, it puts the 
question of the role and purpose of the entity before the courts. The is-
sues related to the role and purpose of business entities are something all 
law students encounter when they first study in the area, and there is a 
long history establishing the basic concepts in the field.   
What it means to “seek profit,” and how to do so, has tradition-
ally been left up to those in charge of the business. Absent a showing of 
fraud, illegality, or self-dealing, the courts generally abstain from review-
ing how a business operates.2 There are signs that this may be changing, 
                                                      
∗ Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law, West 
Virginia University College of Law, Center for Energy and Sustainable Development 
and WVU Center for Innovation in Gas Research and Utilization. This article was 
completed with the generous support of a West Virginia University Hodges Research 
Grant.  Thanks to the editors of Transactions for their efforts on this article and to 
Prof. Jena Martin for her helpful comments and suggestions. This article reflects the 
views and analysis of the author, who is solely responsible for any errors or omissions. 
1 See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 
353, 376 (2017) (stating that “for-profit corporations are required to seek profit”); Lynn 
A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 176 
(2008) (“Corporations seek profits for shareholders, but they seek other things, as well, 
including specific investment, stakeholder benefits, and their own continued exist-
ence.”). 
2 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (discussing the busi-
ness judgment rule and the presumptions afforded to business activities).  
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and those changes run the risk of being harmful to maximizing business 
success and creativity. Even worse, some of these changes are being 
pushed by those seeking increased social responsibility from businesses, 
a goal that stands to lose the most because of these emerging trends. 
Some early research related to constituency statutes suggested 
that increased director discretion might not harm a firm’s access to pub-
lic capital, but even there, the authors noted that “the insignificant reac-
tion to constituency statutes does not guarantee a similar attitude toward 
alternative purpose firms.”3 This caveat was prescient. There are two 
emerging issues that, working together, run the risk of derailing large-
scale socially responsible business decisions: the emergence of social en-
terprise enabling statutes and the demise of director primacy. These is-
sues could have the parallel impacts of limiting business leader creativity 
and risk taking. In addition to reducing socially responsible business ac-
tivities, this could also serve to limit economic growth.  
These emerging concepts threaten to greatly, and gravely, limit 
the scope of business decisions that directors can make for traditional 
for-profit entities, threatening both social responsibility and economic 
growth. This is especially true for Delaware entities. Recent Delaware 
cases, as well as other writings from Delaware judges, suggest that share-
holder wealth maximization has become a more singular and narrow ob-
ligation of for-profit entities, and that other types of entities (such as 
non-profits or benefit corporations) are the only proper entity forms for 
companies seeking to pursue paths beyond pure, and blatant, profit seek-
ing.4  Although other state entity laws tend not to be as severe as Dela-
ware, the fact that Delaware is viewed as a leader in entity law, and often 
leads the way for other states, means the risk is pervasive.   
Now that many states have alternative social enterprise entity 
structures, there is an increased risk that traditional entities will be 
                                                      
3 Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional 
Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 129 (2015). “Con-
stituency statutes, passed as a part of widespread antitakeover legislation, authorize di-
rectors to consider other interests (that is, nonshareholder interests) in corporate ac-
tions.” Id. at 76. 
4 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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viewed (by both courts and directors) as pure profit vehicles, eliminating 
directors’ ability to make choices with the public benefit in mind, even 
where the public benefit is also good for business (at least in the long 
term). Narrowing directors’ decision making in this way limits the op-
tions for innovation, building goodwill, and maintaining an engaged 
workforce, all to the detriment of employees, society, and, yes, share-
holders.  
The potential harm from social benefit entities and eroding direc-
tor primacy are not inevitable, and they are not insurmountable. This 
essay is designed to highlight and explain these risks with the hope that 
identifying and explaining the risks will help courts avoid them. This es-
say will first discuss the role and purpose of limited liability entities and 
explain the foundational concept of director primacy and the risks asso-
ciated with eroding that norm. Next, the essay will describe the emer-
gence of social benefit entities and describe how the mere existence of 
such entities can serve to further erode director primacy and limit busi-
ness leader discretion, leading to lost social benefit and reduced profit 
making. Finally, the essay will make a recommendation about how courts 
can help avoid these harms.   
II.  DIRECTOR PRIMACY AND THE PURPOSE OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
ENTITIES 
How courts describe and assess the role and purpose of business en-
tities is continually evolving, and in recent years, courts have been mov-
ing more and more toward a strict view that the purpose of a business is 
solely to make money.5 There is an increasing sense, with the general 
public and in the courts, that anything else a business does must be sec-
ondary to, and must not at all interfere with, profit seeking.6  
A. Limited Liability Entities 
To help facilitate business development, governments created 
limited liability entities to help encourage investment. Limited liability 
                                                      
5 See id. at 34.  
6 See id.  
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entities, including corporations, limited liability companies (LLCs), and 
limited partnerships, provide investors the ability to invest their capital 
(usually money), while limiting their liability to the sum of that invest-
ment. Investors are thus not personally liable for the debts of the entity, 
and they can only lose the amount invested. The investor can lose all of 
the money he or she exchanged for the stock, but such investors are not 
liable for debts beyond that investment.   
The traditional business entity was the corporation. Corporations 
are created by statute and only exist by grant of state law.7 “[T]he pur-
pose of promoting commerce [is furthered] by providing limited liability 
for shareholders in state corporation laws . . . .”8 The corporation is de-
signed to promote investment and encourage innovation by permitting 
investors to pool resources, while limiting risk of loss (absent fraud, con-
flict of interest, or illegality) to the resources invested in the corporation.9 
State law has requirements that a corporation must follow, including cer-
tain formalities to preserve the corporate entity and preserve the grant of 
limited liability protection that comes with formation of the corporate 
entity.10 These formalities require, among other things, certain filings,11 
annual meetings,12 and regular oversight by a board of directors.13  
The separate nature of the corporation serves to protect both 
shareholders and creditors. A properly formed corporation creates, in 
essence, a separate fictional person, which allows the corporation to op-
                                                      
7 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 1.1 (2d ed. 2009). 
8 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 97 (1986) (quoting David H. Barber, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 373 (1981)). 
9 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 106–110 (11th ed. 2010). 
10 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at § 2.2. 
11 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31D-1-120. 
12 Id. § 31D-7-701. 
13 Id. § 31D-8-801(b); see Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Company, THE CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.theconglomer-
ate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modern-version-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-
company.html. 
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erate, potentially, in perpetuity.14 This separate legal personality of the 
corporation acts to partition the business assets of the entity from the 
assets of the shareholders.15 This separate corporate “person” takes on 
the legal rights and obligations of an individual.16 Those doing business 
with corporations have the option of seeking personal guarantees from 
those working on behalf of the corporation.17 Absent such a guarantee, 
however, investors’ losses are capped at the level of their investment in 
the corporation.18 That is, shareholders have limited liability for actions 
of the corporation, unless the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation 
expressly state otherwise.19 In exchange for this limited liability, share-
holders give up their individual rights to corporate property and instead 
become residual claimants. A corporation’s shareholders only have rights 
to corporate property remaining at liquidation after all other debts and 
obligations of the corporation have been satisfied.20  
Beyond limited liability protection, the asset partition corporate 
formation serves an additional, and critical, purpose that functions to 
protect those doing business with the corporation. The asset partition 
creates a separate and clear set of assets that belong to the firm upon 
which the firm’s creditors have a claim that is superior to any claims by 
personal creditors of any of the corporation’s shareholders.21 As such, 
                                                      
14  W. VA. CODE § 31D-3-302. 
15 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at § 1.1(B). 
16 W. VA. CODE § 31D-3-320 (“Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, 
every corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and has 
the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out 
its business and affairs . . . .”). 
17 See, e.g., Clendenin Lumber & Supply Co., Inc. v. Volpi, 365 S.E.2d 56, 57 (W. Va. 
1987) (finding that a corporate vice president was a personal guarantor of the debt of 
the corporation because he signed a credit application in his capacity both as a corpo-
rate officer and as an individual). 
18 W.VA. CODE § 31D-6-622(b). 
19 See id.   
20 Id. § 31D-14-1405. 
21 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at § 1.1(B). 
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the firm cannot be negatively impacted by the financial problems or oth-
er liabilities of its shareholders (or those of a separate, affiliated corpora-
tion).22 
B. Eroding Director Primacy 
The seminal case of Dodge v. Ford set forth the parameters of the 
business judgment rule and the foundation for the concept of director 
primacy, which is the idea that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the 
directors are responsible for the decision making of the entity.23 There 
are some, like Professor Lynn Stout, who have criticized the foundation-
al role this case has played in business law,24 but the case has appropri-
ately remained among the more important business law cases taught in 
law school.25  
Dean Gordon Smith notes some comparisons between Dodge v. 
Ford26 and the much more recent Delaware case of eBay v. Newmark, not-
ing that there “is an amazing similarity.”27 The comparison is apt, and 
Dean Smith’s take28 on the case, as well as Professor Christine Hurt’s 
                                                      
22 Id. 
23 See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (discussing the 
discretion given to directors in managing the affairs of the entity).  
24 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 
164 (2008) (stating that Dodge v. Ford is to blame for “the idea that corporations exist 
only to make money for shareholders”); see Joshua Fershee, Philanthropy as a Business 
Model: Comparing Ford to Craigslist, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG 
(Sept. 10, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2010/09/philan-
thropy-as-a-business-model-comparing-ford-to-craigslist.html. 
25 M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Com-
pany, 32 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 373, 2007) 
(“Dodge is about much more than it appears on first reading.”), http://www.chi-
cagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1197&context=law_and_eco-
nomics.  
26 Dodge, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
27 eBay, 16 A.3d at 1. 
28 See Smith, supra note 13. 
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assessment29 are insightful, but there is also reason to be critical of the 
Dodge v. Ford analogy. 
In Dodge v. Ford, Henry Ford stated clearly that he was operating 
the business as he saw fit and that he was changing toward supporting 
philanthropic purposes. As the Dodge v. Ford opinion notes: 
‘My ambition,’ declared Mr. Ford, ‘is to em-
ploy still more men; to spread the benefits of 
this industrial system to the greatest possible 
number, to help them build up their lives 
and their homes. To do this, we are putting 
the greatest share of our profits back into 
the business.’ 
. . .  
The record, and especially the testimony of 
Mr. Ford, convinces that he has to some ex-
tent the attitude towards shareholders of one 
who has dispensed and distributed to them 
large gains and that they should be content 
to take what he chooses to give. His testi-
mony creates the impression, also, that he 
thinks the Ford Motor Company has made 
too much money, has had too large profits, 
and that, although large profits might be still 
earned, a sharing of them with the public, by 
reducing the price of the output of the com-
pany, ought to be undertaken. We have no 
doubt that certain sentiments, philanthropic 
and altruistic, creditable to Mr. Ford, had 
large influence in determining the policy to 
                                                      
29 Christine Hurt, eBay v. Craigslist: David & Goliath or Clash of the Titans?, THE CON-
GLOMERATE (May 14, 2008), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/05/ebay-v-
craigsli.html.  
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be pursued by the Ford Motor Company-the 
policy which has been herein referred to.30 
Contrast this with Chancellor Chandler’s explanation of craigslist: 
craigslist’s unique business strategy contin-
ues to be successful, even if it does run 
counter to the strategies used by the titans of 
online commerce. Thus far, no competing 
site has been able to dislodge craigslist from 
its perch atop the pile of most-used online 
classifieds sites in the United States. 
craigslist’s lead position is made more enig-
matic by the fact that it maintains its domi-
nant market position with small-scale physi-
cal and human capital. Perhaps the most 
mysterious thing about craigslist’s continued 
success is the fact that craigslist does not ex-
pend any great effort seeking to maximize its 
profits or to monitor its competition or its 
market share.31 
In further contrast to Henry Ford’s statements, in footnote 6, Chancellor 
Chandler provides a quote from craigslist’s CEO “testifying that 
craigslist’s community service mission ‘is the basis upon which our busi-
ness success rests. Without that mission, I don’t think this company has 
the business success it has. It’s an also-ran. I think it’s a footnote.’”32 
Nonetheless, Chancellor Chandler, as Dean Smith notes, sees these cases 
in a similar vein: 
The corporate form in which craigslist oper-
ates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle 
for purely philanthropic ends, at least not 
when there are other stockholders interested 
                                                      
30 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683–84.  
31 eBay, 16 A.3d at 8. 
32 Id. at 8 n.6. 
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in realizing a return on their investment. Jim 
and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a 
for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily 
accepted millions of dollars from eBay as 
part of a transaction whereby eBay became a 
stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit 
corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers.33 
Although the appropriateness of the other moves taken by the 
majority owners of craigslist is suspect (this is more aptly viewed as a 
self-dealing case), craigslist’s explanation of their business model should 
sufficiently distinguish the mission–and business purpose–from that put 
forth by Henry Ford. That is, had Henry Ford simply stated that he was 
running Ford to be the best company it could be, the court could have 
properly allowed his decisions to stand. To the extent there were con-
cerns about his motivations, that court, too, would have more properly 
treated Dodge v. Ford as a self-dealing case.34  
That is, it’s a concern for Henry Ford to say, in essence, that his 
shareholders should be happy with what they get and that workers and 
others are more important to him than the shareholders.35 However, it 
would have been quite another thing for Ford to say:  
                                                      
33 Id. at 34.  
34 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 33 (“Drawing on the expressive function of law, the 
Court took an opportunity to announce a standard for firms to use in decisionmak-
ing—that firm’s exist to make profits—but simultaneously limiting the role of courts in 
policing this standard to extreme cases of self-dealing or grossly negligent decisionmak-
ing.”). 
35 See id. (“Ford’s rhetoric could not be left unanswered.”).  
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I, along with my board, run this company 
the way I always have: with an eye toward 
long-term growth and stability. That means 
we reinvest many of our profits and take a 
cautious approach to dividends because the 
health of the company comes first. It is our 
belief that is in the best interest of Ford and 
of Ford’s shareholders. 
In Dodge v. Ford, there seemed to be a change in the business 
model (and how the business was operated with regard to dividends) 
once the Dodge Brothers started thinking about competing. All of a 
sudden, Ford became concerned about community first. For craigslist, at 
least with regard to the concept of serving the community, the company 
changed nothing. And, in fact, it seems apparent that craigslist’s view of 
community is one reason, if not the reason, it still has its “perch atop the 
pile.”36 
Thus, while it is true craigslist never needed to accept eBay’s 
money, eBay also knew exactly how craigslist was operated when they 
invested. If they wanted to ensure they could change that, they should 
have bought a majority share rather than relying on a court to question 
the profit-seeking motives of those in charge.37 
One of the main problems with the eBay case is that is has helped 
to reinforce the incorrect notion that “it is literally malfeasance for a cor-
poration not to do everything it legally can to maximize its profits.”38 As 
Professor Todd Henderson has explained:  
                                                      
36 eBay, 16 A.3d at 8. 
37 Maxwell Kennerly, eBay v. Newmark: Al Franken Was Right, Corporations Are Legally 
Required to Maximize Profits, LITIG. & TRIAL (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.litiga-
tionandtrial.com/2010/09/articles/the-law/for-lawyers/ebay-v-newmark-al-franken-
was-right-corporations-are-legally-required-to-maximize-profits/. 
38 Todd Henderson, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Myth, TRUTH ON THE MARKET 
(July 27, 2010), https://truthonthemarket.com/2010/07/27/the-shareholder-wealth-
maximization-myth/. 
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Individuals across the political spectrum 
share this common canard. Those on the 
right, like Milton Friedman, argue that the 
shareholder-wealth-maximization require-
ment prohibits firms from acting in ways 
that benefit, say, local communities or the 
environment, at the expense of the bottom 
line. Those on the left, like Franken, argue 
that the duty to shareholders makes corpora-
tions untrustworthy and dangerous. They are 
both wrong.39 
The Franken-like argument, which the eBay decision reinforces 
from a more conservative approach, seems to suggest that Dela-
ware’s Revlon duties, which require the “board to enhance short-term 
shareholder value,”40 apply all the time, and not just when the board puts 
the company up for sale. This interpretation makes for good political 
sound bites, and is a plausible interpretation, but that is not exactly what 
Chancellor Chandler’s opinion says.  
Instead, the Chancellor stated that craigslist’s majority owners 
“prove[d] that they personally believe craigslist should not be about the 
business of stockholder wealth maximization, now or in the future.”41 
Thus, he concluded, “The corporate form in which craigslist operates . . . 
is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not 
when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their 
investment.”42 As such, corporations clearly can do at least some things 
that are philanthropic; it’s just that they cannot be “solely” philanthrop-
ic—thus the Dodge v. Ford connection. 
                                                      
39 Id.   
40 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del. 1989).  
41 eBay, 16 A.3d at 34. 
42 Id.  
372          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [Vol. 19 
The problem with Chancellor Chandler’s conclusion is that 
craigslist is not a nonprofit, and it files and pays taxes like any other 
(proper, for-profit) corporation. According to a BusinessWeek article, 
the company started being profitable in 1999 and has remained so.43 
That said, it is also true that the company’s leaders repeatedly stated that 
that they were not trying to take over the world or maximize wealth.44 Of 
course, choosing not to try to aggressively expand is not inherently good 
or bad, just as a company deciding to grow as fast as possible is neither 
inherently good nor bad.  
In addition, under the Delaware General Corporation Code 
§ 101(b), “[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under this 
chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . . .”45 
Certainly there is nothing there that indicates a company must maximize 
profits or take risks or “monetize” anything. Chancellor Chandler con-
cedes as much when he notes that it is at least conceivable that a philan-
thropic company may be okay when there are no “other stockholders 
interested in realizing a return on their investment.”46 
Thus, the real question is what it means to say there was a stock-
holder “interested” in realizing a return on their investment. As men-
tioned above, eBay knew the kind of company in which they were buying 
shares (and taking a minority position). Craigslist was operating exactly 
with the same philosophy as they had before eBay bought in to the com-
pany. And, in fact, that philosophy is probably why eBay invested: they 
wanted to reserve a right to compete, but be a part of monetization if 
craigslist chose that path. 
As such, eBay’s primary motive was not any specific expectation 
of a return on investment. Instead, eBay invested as something of a 
hedge—they recognized that if craigslist were to monetize, craigslist 
                                                      
43 Craigslist's Ongoing Success Story, BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2007).  
44 See id.; Don Dodge, Craigslist's Jim Buckmaster on why bigger isn't better - The Mythical Man 
Month, TYPEPAD (May 18, 2007), http://dondodge.typepad.com/the_next_big_thing 
/2007/05/craigslist_phil.html.  
45 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b). 
46 eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.  
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would likely become a huge revenue source, and they wanted to ensure 
eBay was part of that process if (not necessarily when) that were ever to 
happen.47 As shareholders, eBay had reserved the right to compete with 
craigslist, allowing eBay to pursue monetizing a similar product. (And it’s 
not clear that eBay was not getting a return on the investment; it was 
likely just a lower return than some people think that return might have 
been had craigslist monetized its product more broadly.) As such, it is 
improper to allow eBay, simply by virtue of being a shareholder, to re-
quire a change in the way in which craigslist operates. This is not a bait-
and-switch situation where craigslist changed the rules of the game (at 
least with regard to their corporate philosophy) after cashing eBay’s 
check. 
Therefore, Chancellor Chandler’s assessment that craigslist was 
operating as a “purely philanthropic” corporation is incorrect, and eBay 
was not being deprived of any expected potential return on investment.48 
Just because craigslist’s majority owners used a lot of pro-philanthropic 
language, that does not change the fact that craigslist was a market leader 
seeking to perpetuate that position. At the end of the day, then, craigslist 
may operate as a “largely” philanthropic entity, but it is exactly the kind 
of small-but-profitable entity eBay bought a portion of in the first place. 
And that, as matter of contract and under Delaware law, is fine.  At least, 
it should be.   
A closer look at Chancellor Chandler's opinion in eBay v. New-
mark, though, proves troubling in that by embracing a “community ser-
vice mission,” craigslist was determined to be improper as a corporate 
entity.49 Recall that Chancellor Chandler explained that by choosing “a 
for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fidu-
                                                      
47 Cf. David Gelles, Ebay Hoped to Acquire Craigslist, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, 
https://www.ft.com/content/4630e366-e380-11de-8d36-00144feab49a (stating that 
eBay bought craigslist stock in part to keep other Internet companies from being able 
to do so). 
48 See id.  
49 See id. at 8 n.6. 
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ciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of 
its stockholders.”50 
But embracing a “community service mission” is not inconsistent 
with “promot[ing] the value of a corporation for the benefit of its stock-
holders.”51 In fact, the community service mission might be the precise 
reason that stockholders were reaping the benefit of a profitable compa-
ny in the first place: customers liked the company’s mission. Ben & Jer-
ry’s Ice Cream, for example, built its reputation on community connec-
tion. Ben & Jerry’s began as a small start-up looking to expand its busi-
ness, and over time, the company began to grow.52 Along with this 
growth, the company embraced environmental causes and created a 
foundation giving seven and a half percent of pretax profits for distribu-
tion to worthy causes.53 Of course, the company would not likely have 
any value if the ice cream were bad (just as craigslist would have no value 
if it did not work to sell things), but the company philosophy helped 
build the brand.   
Ben & Jerry’s grew to the point that it is now a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Unilever.54 The company has a three-tiered mission state-
ment,55 which includes a social mission, a product mission, and an eco-
nomic mission. The economic mission of Ben & Jerry’s is “[t]o operate 
the Company on a sustainable financial basis of profitable growth, in-
creasing value for our stakeholders and expanding opportunities for de-
velopment and career growth for our employees.”56  
                                                      
50 Id. at 34.  
51 Id. at 8 n.6, 34. 
52 About Us, BEN & JERRY’S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/about-
us. 
53 Id.  
54 See UNILEVER, https://www.unilever.com. 
55 Our Values, BEN & JERRY’S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/val-
ues. 
56 Id.  
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Furthermore, the company explains: 
Capitalism and the wealth it produces do not 
create opportunity for everyone equally. We 
recognize that the gap between the rich and 
the poor is wider than at any time since the 
1920’s. We strive to create economic oppor-
tunities for those who have been denied 
them and to advance new models of eco-
nomic justice that are sustainable and repli-
cable.57 
Is Ben & Jerry’s just as vulnerable as craigslist to a shareholder 
complaint? Obviously not directly, because Unilever owns all the shares. 
But should Unilever be permitted to allow Ben & Jerry’s to operate in 
this manner? There is now a risk that Unilever’s shareholders could have 
a legitimate complaint. After all, if the use of the corporate form for such 
goals is improper, it should be an improper use of Unilever’s assets, too.  
Unilever could seek to accomplish Ben & Jerry’s goals through a variety 
of other mechanisms, such as the use of gifts to a nonprofit entity or 
forming a foundation.58 But if the use of the corporate form to pursue 
Ben & Jerry’s goals without the primary stated goal of profiting for the 
shareholders is improper, this is an instance where form would triumph 
over substance under the eBay standard.   
Perhaps the answer instead lies in the size of the investment or 
the amount of money available to be made. That is, Ben & Jerry’s is a 
small portion of Unilever, so Unilever shareholders would not have too 
much to complain about.59 Regardless of the decision, Ben & Jerry’s is a 
small part of the overall parent entity.  
                                                      
57 Ben & Jerry’s, UNILEVER, https://www.unileverusa.com/brands/our-brands/ben-
and-jerrys.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
58 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).  
59 There are scholars who view Unilever’s acquisition of Ben & Jerry’s as a bad thing for 
a different reason, claiming that “[w]hen large corporations acquire social enterprises, 
they sever the connection between these smaller entities and the communities they were 
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Chancellor Chandler noted that “[i]f Jim and Craig were the on-
ly stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be no one 
to object. eBay, however, holds a significant stake in craigslist, and Jim 
and Craig’s actions affect others besides themselves.”60 Perhaps it is this 
“significant stake” that is the problem.61 That is, if the decision pursued 
seems significant enough (or the potential loss of not pursuing the ap-
parently more profitable end is great enough), then the Delaware court 
will step in and provide its own judgment. If so, it seems to mean that 
the business judgment rule can be rebutted in another way, in addition to 
showing fraud, self-dealing, and illegality—by showing the likely profita-
bility of choosing another course.   
Beyond that, the decision suggests that entity purpose is tested 
differently based on ownership. That is, Ben & Jerry’s can do as a subsid-
iary of a large company what it could not do as a stand-alone entity. That 
cannot be the state of Delaware law.  
A more recent company decision helps demonstrate that the eBay 
decision may be impacting how companies publicly explain company 
decisions. In February 2015, CVS/Caremark announced that that the 
company would no longer sell tobacco products in its 7,600 U.S. phar-
macies. The entity estimated that it would lose about $2 billion in reve-
nues from the decision. CVS managed the announcement well, and the 
company received generally good press about the decision.62 
On its face, this is a reasonable decision and the board appears to 
have properly exercised its authority to set CVS stores up for long-term 
success. The company tried to maximize the feel-good story of the deci-
                                                                                                                               
intended to serve.” Joanne Bauer & Elizabeth Umlas, Do Benefit Corporations Respect Hu-
man Rights?, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2017, at 27, 32, available at 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/do_benefit_corporations_respect_human_rights. As this 
article explains, this is not always true, or at least, it does not have to be.   
60 eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.  
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen, CVS Decision to Stop Selling Cigarettes Changed Customers’ Lives, 
HUFFPOST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cvs-decision-to-
stop-selling-cigarettes-changed-customers-lives_us_58d141a0e4b00705db52d501. 
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sion,63 but that message was noticeably tempered by CVS when it also 
explained the profit-seeking role of the decision with the announce-
ment.64 It seems apparent that CVS’s board (or their counsel) read eBay v. 
Newmark.65 
The CVS announcement had two components. First, 
the consumer component66—for the “aren’t-they-great?” response: 
We have about 26,000 pharmacists and 
nurse practitioners helping patients man-
age chronic problems like high cholester-
ol, high blood pressure and heart disease, 
all of which are linked to smoking,’ said 
Larry J. Merlo, chief executive of CVS. 
‘We came to the decision that cigarettes 
and providing health care just don’t go 
together in the same setting.67  
Second, was the business-judgment-rule spin—a/k/a the “hey-we’re-
not-craigslist68-or-Ford”69—statement:  
The decision to exit the tobacco category 
does not affect the company's 2014 seg-
ment operating profit guidance, 2014 EPS 
                                                      
63 See George Anderson, Can CVS Justify Its No-Tobacco Decision Beyond the Great PR?, 
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/retailwire/2014/02/05/can-
cvs-justify-its-no-tobacco-decision-beyond-the-great-pr/ #6950cf23fe0d.  
64 See Daniel Gross, CVS Quits Tobacco to Become a Medical Giant, DAILYBEAST (Feb. 5, 
2014), https://www.thedailybeast.com/cvs-quits-tobacco-to-become-a-medical-giant. 
65 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 1.   
66 See Stephanie Strom, CVS Vows to Quit Selling Tobacco Products, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/business/cvs-plans-to-end-sales-of-to-
bacco-products-by-october.html?_r=1.  
67 Id.  
68 See Smith, supra note 13.  
69 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 668.   
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guidance, or the company's five-year fi-
nancial projections provided at its De-
cember 18th Analyst Day. The company 
estimates that it will lose approximately $2 
billion in revenues on an annual basis 
from the tobacco shopper, equating to 
approximately 17 cents per share. Given 
the anticipated timing for implementation 
of this change, the impact to 2014 earn-
ings per share is expected to be in the 
range of 6 to 9 cents per share. The com-
pany has identified incremental opportu-
nities that are expected to offset the prof-
itability impact. This decision more close-
ly aligns the company with its patients, 
clients and health care providers to im-
prove health outcomes while controlling 
costs and positions the company for con-
tinued growth.70 
Although a company may choose to do the second part to pla-
cate investors, a company should do so because that is how they want to 
do business, and not because of the recent language used by the Dela-
ware courts. The proper application of the business judgment rule is as 
an abstention doctrine71—absent conflicts of interest, fraud, or illegality, 
CVS should be able to make this decision without further justifica-
tion.72 The court should abstain, but courts seem to want more. 
                                                      
70 CVS Caremark to Stop Selling Tobacco at all CVS/Pharmacy Locations, PR NEWSWIRE, 
(Feb. 05, 2014) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cvs-caremark-to-stop-
selling-tobacco-at-all-cvspharmacy-locations-243662651.html. 
71 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at § 6.1. Some view the business judgment rule as a 
standard of review rather than an abstention doctrine, and while the outcome is usually 
the same, the latter is the better course.  See id. 
72 See id. 
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Chancellor Chandler wanted more. He was not satisfied that 
craigslist was profitable or that the company had achieved market-
leading status through its chosen course of operations: 
craigslist’s unique business strategy con-
tinues to be successful, even if it does run 
counter to the strategies used by the titans 
of online commerce. Thus far, no com-
peting site has been able to dislodge 
craigslist from its perch atop the pile of 
most-used online classifieds sites in the 
United States. craigslist’s lead position is 
made more enigmatic by the fact that it 
maintains its dominant market position 
with small-scale physical and human capi-
tal. Perhaps the most mysterious thing 
about craigslist’s continued success is the 
fact that craigslist does not expend any 
great effort seeking to maximize its prof-
its or to monitor its competition or its 
market share.73 
For Chancellor Chandler and Delaware courts, rather than ab-
staining—or looking for self-dealing—they are now looking behind the 
motive of the decision making. As such, CVS had to go further to show 
where their decision fit within their profit-making scenario. Now Dela-
ware Supreme Court Chief Justice Strine agrees. Strine states, “[T]he 
corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to 
pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”74   
Chief Justice Strine immediately seeks to soften the blow by ex-
plaining, “The directors, of course, retain substantial discretion, outside 
the context of a change of control, to decide how best to achieve that 
                                                      
73 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 8. 
74 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay: Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012).  
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goal and the appropriate time frame for delivering those returns.”75 The 
problem is that this qualifier does not ring true if you add this philoso-
phy together with the eBay decision, which appears to require “great ef-
fort” to maximize profits,76 or monitor competition or market share, as 
opposed to pursuing a corporate philosophy that creates and maintains 
profitability and market leadership. 
It is worth noting here that my concern about courts second 
guessing managers in this way has been implied to be a view coming 
from the political (or at least ideological) left.77 That is inaccurate.  If any-
thing, this critique comes from a conservative perspective. That is, when 
courts substitute their judgment for the decisions of directors, govern-
ment is interfering in what should remain in the control of private citi-
zens. Delaware law, and business law general, should tread lightly on 
such decisions, which (again) is why the business judgment rule should 
be applied as an abstention doctrine.78   
Thus, this is not about corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).79 
This is about director primacy and keeping the courts out of the board-
room as much as possible.80 CVS should be able to decide to drop to-
bacco if they wish, just as craigslist should be able to decide that it wants 
to stay profitable and be a market leader forever. If long-term success, in 
the board’s judgment, means not selling cigarettes or not monetizing and 
                                                      
75 Id.  
76 eBay, 16 A.3d at 8. 
77 See Strine, supra note 74, at 149–50 n.44 (discussing the views of “liberal commentator 
and lawyer” Maxwell S. Kennerly and citing Joshua P. Fershee, The Wake of the eBay 
Decision: Is Ben & Jerry’s Next?, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG 
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2010/12/the-wake-
of-the-ebay-decision-is-ben-jerrys-next-.html). 
78 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at § 6.1. 
79 See Corporate Social Responsibility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/c/corp-social-responsibility.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).  
80 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, UCLA, LAW-ECON RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES No. 10-06. (May 25, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1615838. 
2017]                   THE END OF RESPONSIBLE GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE?                   381 
 
not taking risks of a boom and bust, that should be a reasonable business 
decision beyond the reach of the courts.  
To illustrate this point: it cannot be that case that Boston Mar-
ket81 and Krispy Kreme82 had to expand as fast as possible and seek as 
much profit as they could in the near term. With the benefit of hindsight, 
the expansion model both pursued was a disaster. Directors are sup-
posed to be in charge and make these type of decisions, not the share-
holders, and not the courts. Because the business judgment rule is 
properly viewed as an abstention doctrine,83 courts should stay out of it 
unless there is a strong indication of a conflict of interest, fraud, or ille-
gality.  
CVS took the proper steps to minimize the risk of a court inter-
vention. They should not, however, have to justify that decision to any-
one but their shareholders when it is time for director elec-
tions. Companies should be free to pursue their course of business for 
any lawful purpose without courts second guessing their motives absent 
a requisite showing that directors’ business judgment should not apply.84 
That alone could prove harmful in developing a company’s image for 
consumers, and that risk of negative profit impact should be sufficient to 
make clear that director primacy should be respected.   
 
 
                                                      
81 See Don Daszkowski, History of Boston Market, THE BALANCE (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-boston-market-1350952.  
82 See Learning from the Franchising Mistakes of Failed Krispy Kreme, MORE BUSINESS, (Jan. 
27, 2010), http://www.morebusiness.com/franchise-risks.  
83 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule is NOT a Standard of Review, PRO-
FESSOR BAINBRIDGE (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com 
/professorbainbridgecom/2011/01/this-is-the-sort-of-arrant-nonsense-about-the-
business-judgment-rule-up-with-which-i-will-not-put.html.  
84 See Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What’s the Board Got to Do With It?, 2013 Ill. 
L. Rev. 959, 995 (“[G]iving boards the leeway to examine business and human rights 
issues may go a long way towards mitigating ‘short-termism.’”). 
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III.   THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIAL BENEFIT ENTITY 
In parallel to the “business as profit seeker” movement described 
above, there has been a growing desire to see businesses be more socially 
responsible and promote public welfare.85 The corporate social responsi-
bility movement emerged to try to hold businesses accountable and 
promote a public welfare obligation. In addition, voluntary certification 
programs now allow businesses to seek external review to demonstrate 
to consumers their commitment to social responsibility.  
State governments have now stepped into the action, creating 
new laws allowing for social benefit entities like benefit corporations and 
low-profit limited liability companies.86 These entities give those in 
charge of the entity greater latitude to consider stakeholder needs and 
external concerns in deciding how to operate the business. These goals 
are admirable, especially as a voluntary option, but the existence of these 
entities poses a threat to decision making for those in charge of tradi-
tional entities.   
A benefit corporation is similar to, although different from, the 
low-profit limited liability company (or L3C), which only a few states 
adopted. Unlike the benefit corporation, L3Cs have not taken off. In 
fact, North Carolina abolished its 2010 L3C law as of January 1, 2014.87 
As both the benefit corporation and the L3C are generally not going to 
be tax-exempt for federal income tax purposes, the state law distinction 
makes a difference to the IRS. The benefit corporation is presumably 
going to be taxed as a C Corporation, unless it qualifies and makes the 
election to be an S Corp (and there’s nothing in the legislation that sug-
                                                      
85 See GEORGE A. STEINER, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 164 (1971) (“Business is and must 
remain fundamentally an economic institution, but . . . it does have responsibilities to 
help society achieve its basic goals and does, therefore, have social responsibilities.”). 
86 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2015). Note also that cooperatives are another 
option for a community benefit entity, but the cooperative’s long history does not have 
the same overlap or create the same challenges as public benefit entities.  See Elaine 
Waterhouse Wilson, Cooperatives: The First Social Enterprise, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 
1016 (2017) (“A cooperative is a business entity that is owned and managed by its 
members—those individuals for whose benefit the cooperative was organized.”). 
87 Law of January 1, 2014, ch. 57D, § 20, 2014 N.C. Laws 2, 2013-157 (repealed 2013).  
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gests a benefit corporation could not qualify as an S Corp as a matter of 
law). By contrast, the L3C, by default will be taxed as a partnership, alt-
hough again it could conceivably check the box to be treated as a C Corp 
(and even then making an S election). The choice of entity determina-
tion, as is usually the case, would be made, in part, based upon the plan-
ning needs of the individual equity holders and the potential for venture 
capital or an IPO in the future. 
Social benefit entities, as demonstrated by the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, are about “purpose.”88 The model legislation 
provides that benefit corporations must seek a “general public benefit,” 
which means “[a] material positive impact on society and the environ-
ment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the 
business and operations of a benefit corporation.”89 That “general public 
benefit purpose” standard is, as Professor J. Haskell Murray explains, 
“both too vague and too confining.”90 It is too vague “because it does 
not provide a practical way for directors to make decisions.”91 And it is 
too confining because making directors in such entities “consider an un-
prioritized group of stakeholders while also requiring [an entity] purpose 
that looks at societal and environmental impact as a whole is not only un-
workable, but could also exclude corporations with a more specific mis-
sion.”92 
Beyond these reasons, though, there is a more compelling reason 
to disfavor the existence of social benefit entities. In 2014, my colleague 
                                                      
88 See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a) (2014). 
89 J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 549 (2016) 
(citing MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a) (2014), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislatio
n.pdf). 
90 J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012).  
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 32. 
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Elaine Wilson and I wrote March of the Benefit Corporation: So Why Bother? 
Isn’t the Business Judgment Rule Alive and Well?93 We observed: 
Regardless of jurisdiction, there may be 
value in having an entity that plainly states 
the entity’s benefit purpose, but in most 
instances, it does not seem necessary (and 
is perhaps even redundant). Furthermore, 
the existence of the benefit corporation 
opens the door to further scrutiny of the 
decisions of corporate directors who take 
into account public benefit as part of their 
business planning, which erodes director 
primacy, which limits director options, 
which can, ultimately, harm businesses by 
stifling innovation and creativity.  In other 
words, this raises the question: does the 
existence of the benefit corporation as an 
alternative entity mean that traditional 
business corporations will be held to an 
even stricter, profit-maximization stand-
ard?94 
As discussed earlier, the erosion of director primacy and a more 
intrusive application of the business judgment rule is already a concern 
for business-leader decision making. With the addition of social benefit 
entities, courts are even more likely to question the business purpose of 
traditional entities. Although the risks these new entities create could be 
                                                      
93 See Joshua Fershee & Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, March of the Benefit Corporation: So 
Why Bother? Isn’t the Business Judgment Rule Alive and Well?, Part III, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS 
NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 23, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad. 
com/business_law/2014/09/march-of-the-benefit-corporation-so-why-bother-isnt-
the-business-judgment-rule-alive-and-well-part-i.html.  
94 Id.  
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addressed through law, passing more laws and regulations to fix the 
things we added is not especially efficient.95   
Entity purpose should be viewed through the principle of direc-
tor primacy.96 Directors are obligated to run the entity for the benefit of 
the shareholders, but, absent fraud, illegality, or self-dealing, the directors 
should decide what actions are for the benefit of shareholders. As such, 
the profit-maximization norm for traditional entities remains intact, but 
absent some reason to question director motives, neither courts nor 
shareholders should decide what “profit maximizing” means.   
Some social benefit entity statutes predicted this risk and actively 
stated that traditional entities are not in any way impacted by the creation 
of the new statute. Tennessee, for example, provides the following in its 
benefit corporations statute:  
This chapter shall not affect a statute or 
other rule of law applicable to a domestic 
business corporation that is not a for-
profit benefit corporation, except as pro-
vided in § 48-28-104. Specifically, no im-
plication is made by, and no inference 
may be drawn from, the enactment of this 
chapter as to whether, in exercising their 
duties, the officers or directors of a do-
mestic business corporation that is not a 
for-profit benefit corporation may con-
sider the impact of the corporation's 
transactions or other conduct on: 
                                                      
95 See Joshua Fershee, Fake News! Trump's LLCs Are Not Corporations, L. PROFESSOR 
BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (May 2, 2017), http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/05/fake-news-trumps-llcs-are-not-corporations 
.html. 
96 See Joshua Fershee, CVS: More Evidence Courts are Creeping into the Boardroom, L. PRO-
FESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 11, 2014), http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/02/cvs-more-evidence-courts-are-creeping-into-
the-boardroom.html.  
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(1) The interests of those materially af-
fected by the corporation's conduct, in-
cluding the pecuniary interests of share-
holders; or 
(2) Any public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its charter.97 
This language provides little comfort given the direction at least 
Delaware law has taken with regard to the business judgment rule and 
director primacy. Furthermore, despite the language of the statute, the 
existence of an entity type that specifically allows profit seeking entities 
to pursue public benefit cannot help but suggest that entities not formed 
as benefit entities have a different purpose. If nothing else, these entities 
can be expected to heighten courts’ sensitivity to claims that those in 
charge of a traditional business entity are not properly or adequately 
seeking profit.  
The risk of the social benefit entity serving as a problematic foil 
for traditional entities is exacerbated by the fact that states have flocked 
to pass such statutes, but relatively few entities have adopted the entity 
form.98 In addition, Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway’s research was 
unable to assess a publicly held U.S. benefit corporation,99 and the lack 
of such entities—there is only such company in existence100—could lead 
                                                      
97 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-109 (2016). 
98 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. 
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 611, 613 (2017).  
99 Id. at 615. Etsy is a certified B Corp, but it is not a benefit corporation. Haskell Mur-
ray, Esty to Drop B Corp Certification, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF 
BLOG (Dec. 1, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/12/etsy-
to-drop-b-corp-certification.html. 
100 Heminway, supra note 98, at 615 n.16. Laureate Education, Inc., is the first publicly 
traded benefit corporation. See Press Release, Laureate International Universities, Lau-
reate Education Announces Closing of its Initial Public Offering (Feb. 6, 2017), 
http://www.laureate.net/NewsRoom/PressReleases/2017/02/Laureate-Education-
Announces-Closing-of-its-Initial-Public-Offering; Haskell Murray, First Standalone Public-
ly Traded Benefit Corporation - Laureate Education, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. 
PROF BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017 
/02/first-standalone-publicly-traded-benefit-corporation-laureate-education-.html.  
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courts to determine that publicly traded entities do not have the latitude 
to pursue public benefit that is not directly and clearly linked to profit 
motive. As Professor Heminway explains, “the benefit corporation struc-
ture places pressure on the intersection between the corporation's benefit 
purpose and managerial conduct.”101 Similarly, the benefit corporation 
puts pressure on the intersection of profit seeking and the traditional 
corporation.   
This reality is playing out with perhaps the highest profile B 
Corp, Etsy, preparing to drop its B Corp certification rather than rein-
corporate as a Delaware public benefit corporation statute.102 B Lab tried 
to help Etsy by modifying a deadline for converting to a public benefit 
corporation,103 but Etsy’s new management team still determined that the 
desire to increase sales was not being assisted by the B Corp certification, 
despite the company’s “best intentions.”104   
Etsy provides a perfect example of this tension, as the new man-
agement team considers whether the company’s sales mission is compat-
ible with other goals. As a public company, these tensions are especially 
acute. An early employee of the company claimed, “There’s only so 
much wiggle room as a public company. If you really want to build a 
company that works for people and the planet, capitalism isn’t the solu-
tion.”105  It is a reality that public companies face media and analyst pres-
sures that private companies often do not, and it is here that the public 
benefit entity causes the most confusion.   
Before public benefit entities, Etsy would likely have been 
viewed simply as a company that had intertwined its sales mission with 
its public benefit mission as a means to run a good company. But, when 
                                                      
101 Heminway, supra note 98, at 646. 
102 David Gelles, The Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2017, at BU1, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman. html?_r=0.  
103 Murray, supra note 99. 
104 Gelles, supra note 102, at BU1. 
105 Id. 
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earnings are not as good as analysts hope, the benefit entity overlay raises 
questions about whether the public benefit part of the entity’s mission is 
the reason earnings lagged. In Etsy’s case, the B Corp requirement of 
reincorporation helped highlight this concern, leading the company to 
pull back on its public benefit mission, which is a predictable and unsur-
prising, if unfortunate, response from management.   
IV.  CONCLUSION: ERODING DIRECTOR PRIMACY AND SOCIAL BENEFIT 
ENTITIES DO NOT MIX 
The evolving views of director primacy and application of the 
business judgment rule mark significant changes in the law and, in some 
cases, are doctrinally unsound.   
First, the eBay case may have added options to rebut the business 
judgment rule or switched that burden to directors, forcing them to af-
firmatively assert profit motive. Under traditional business judgment rule 
standard, it is the plaintiff’s job is to show fraud, illegality, or self-dealing. 
It is at least arguable that eBay and Chief Justice Strine are suggesting that 
there is a new way to rebut the business judgment rule: in addition to 
showing fraud, self-dealing, and illegality, the rule can be rebutted by 
showing the likely profitability of choosing another course, at least if the 
profitability is potentially significant. This is significant change in applica-
tion of the business judgment rule and an improper one.   
Another way to look at evolving Delaware law would be to view 
it as burden shifting, with courts now requiring directors (as fiduciaries) 
to justify their decisions without any showing by the plaintiff of the 
things traditionally necessary to rebut the business judgment rule in the 
first place. That is, simply showing directors had an unwillingness to pur-
sue additional profit and a lack of an affirmative statement that declining 
to pursue a potentially profitable course of action is, in fact, profit based, 
could be sufficient. This is a new way to view the business judgment rule, 
and it cannot help but having a chilling effect on directors’ assessment of 
business opportunities. It cannot be that simply not pursuing risk, with-
out more, is a breach of a fiduciary duty.   
As noted above, the new jurisprudence could force directors to 
state a position about profit seeking that actually serves to undermine 
their business-based motive and public relations objectives. This im-
properly usurps director power and potentially harms the entity and, in 
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turn, the shareholders.  Alternatively, it could motivate directors to pur-
sue risks that they would not otherwise take simply because of perceived 
risk or a noisy, risk-loving shareholder.  
Finally, to be doctrinally sound, the rationale for the business 
judgment rule must apply to all director decisions that are not a result of 
a breach of fiduciary duty. That is, if the rule does not work in both di-
rections—where the directors pursue risk and fail or eschew risk and do 
not profit—the explanation of the doctrine (or the application of it) is 
wrong.  
Thus, if the directors of an entity pursue rapid growth that fails 
miserably, but that decision did not rise to the level of gross negligence, 
the director should not face liability. Similarly, if directors choose not to 
pursue a path that could prove lucrative, even wildly so, they should not 
face liability, absent a showing of self-dealing. The former appears clear 
under Delaware law, but the latter is less so. As noted above, what it 
means to be “profit maximizing” is to be defined by the directors, absent 
a breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly, the purpose of the corporation 
should be defined by the directors under the same standard.  
The protections of the business judgment rule are intended to 
run both ways, but the new-found prevalence of social benefit entity 
statutes has made this reciprocal nature less clear.106 There is an emerging 
sense that the business judgment rule exists to protect decisions (and 
presume good faith) where risk (and loss) follows, while choosing social-
ly responsible (or even just risk averse) paths seems to allow a presump-
tion of bad faith or waste.   
Before social benefit entities emerged, directors were deemed to 
be the ones in charge of the company. That should still be the case. 
Courts should work to ensure they apply the same standard to director 
decisions regardless of whether the decision is clearly profit seeking or 
clearly not, because directors are in charge of the company. Before look-
ing behind a decision, plaintiffs must show courts why the directors 
should be second guessed. The existence of another entity form, social 
                                                      
106 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2015). 
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benefit or otherwise, should not change the duties of directors of exist-
ing entities. If courts are not careful, however, those duties will change. 
And perhaps they already have.   
 
 
